Reply to Opp. to MTD; Mem. of P. & A.

that Kennedy does not have standing to bring this petition and has not sufficiently pled his claim.

3 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

KENNEDY'S ALLEGATIONS ARE CONCLUSORY AND NOT SUPPORTED BY A STATEMENT OF SPECIFIC FACTS.

ARGUMENT

Rule 2 of the Rules Governing Habeas Corpus Cases establishes the pleading requirements for a federal habeas corpus petition. Subsection (c) requires a petitioner to "state the facts supporting each ground" for relief, as "conclusory allegations which are not supported by a statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas relief." *James v. Borg*, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994). Summary dismissal is appropriate where the allegations in the petition are vague or conclusory. *Hendricks v. Vasquez*, 908 F.2d 490, 491 (9th Cir. 1990); *see also Wacht v. Cardwell*, 604 F.2d 1245, 1247 (9th Cir. 1979) ("Notice pleading is not sufficient, for the petition is expected to state facts that point to a real possibility of constitutional error").

Here, rather than simply remedy the defect in his pleading and inform this Court which parole hearing he challenges in his habeas petition, Kennedy instead argues that his lack of legal sophistication excuses him from the requirement that he state facts to support his claim for habeas relief. To support this argument, he cites *Davis v. Silva*, which noted that in the context of presenting a federal claim for purposes of exhaustion, the Ninth Circuit "has held pro se pleadings to a less stringent standard than briefs by counsel and reads pro se pleadings generously, 'however inartfully pleaded.'" 511 F.3d 1005, 1009 (9th Cir. 2008), *citing Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, the *Davis* court's holding did not hold that pro se litigants are exempt from basic pleading requirements. On the contrary, the *Davis* court found that the petitioner had properly exhausted his claims because he had provided "all the facts necessary to state a claim for relief." *Davis*, 511 F.3d at 1011 (citations omitted).

Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has held that a pro se habeas petitioner's lack of legal knowledge is not a sufficient defense for failure to meet procedural requirements. For example, in *Raspberry v. Garcia*, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006), the Ninth Circuit recognized that a

pro se petitioner's "lack of legal sophistication" is not a defense to filing a petition beyond the one-year statute of limitations. The same logic applies here, as Kennedy's alleged lack of legal knowledge should not excuse him from meeting the basic requirement of stating the facts upon which relief may be granted.

Kennedy claims that his hearings before the Board have been "sham hearings," and that the Board improperly denied him parole. (Pet. at 6b.) However, he gives no indication as to what parole hearing he is challenging, nor does he provide any specific facts from which Respondent could determine what hearing is at issue. As such, his petition should be dismissed for failure to sufficiently state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

CONCLUSION

Lack of legal sophistication does not excuse Kennedy from the most basic of pleading requirements—that is, stating sufficient facts to support his claim. As such, the petition for writ of habeas corpus should be dismissed for failure to sufficiently plead a claim.

Dated: August 13, 2008

Respectfully submitted,

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DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY U.S. MAIL

Case Name: Kennedy v. Curry

No.:

C08-1090 JSW

I declare:

I am employed in the Office of the Attorney General, which is the office of a member of the California State Bar, at which member's direction this service is made. I am 18 years of age or older and not a party to this matter. I am familiar with the business practice at the Office of the Attorney General for collection and processing of correspondence for mailing with the United States Postal Service. In accordance with that practice, correspondence placed in the internal mail collection system at the Office of the Attorney General is deposited with the United States Postal Service that same day in the ordinary course of business.

On August 13, 2008, I served the attached

REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid, in the internal mail collection system at the Office of the Attorney General at 455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000, San Francisco, CA 94102-7004, addressed as follows:

Edward D. Kennedy D-30780 Correctional Training Facility P.O. Box 689 Soledad, CA 93960-0689 In Pro Per D-30780

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California the foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration was executed on August 13, 2008, at San Francisco, California.

S. Redd Of Hedd
Declarant Signature

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